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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
BESSIE AUERBACH, MADELINE A. 
W.ERNER~ and SELMA A. MOHR~ 
Plaintiffs and Appellants~ 
VS~ 
FANNIE F. A. SAMUELS~ L. R. SAM~ 
UELS, and FREDERICK FOX 
AUERBACH., and f ANNIE F. Ar 
SAMUELS., L. R. SAMUELS~ FREDE. 
RICK FOX AUERBACH~ and WALK-
ER BANK & TRUST COMPANY as 
Trustees of the Testamentatv 1 .. rust 
,/ 
created under the terms of the Last Will 
and Testament of FREDERICK S~ 
AUERBACH) deceased) 
Defendant! and Respondentsr 
Case No. 
9090 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Certain omissions from the statement of appellants make 
it necessary for respondent to restate the facts before this court. 
... 
:> 
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0 n May 28~ 1 938, Fred erick Auerbach died testate. His 
will was adm (tted to probate in the District Court of Salt Lake 
County on June 1.3~ 1938. In addition to Paragraph Second of 
tbe will dealing specifically with the legacies in question, 
quoted by appellants at Page 6~ 7 of their brief:- the will had 
other provisions relevant to construction of Paragraph Second: 
n First~ I direct the payment of all my just debts .and 
funeral expenses, by my executrix hereinafter named, 
as soon as practicable after my decease~ excepting 
hov..Tever such debts as are secured by mortgage on 
rea I estate of Y.l hich 1 rna y die seized.·' 
After Paragraph Second are certain other specific bequests 
to certain nieces and nephews (including the children of ap-
pellant Mohr). The residue is teft in trust for the use of ~'my 
beloved wife Fannie Fox Auerbach~! and then to his son Fred-
erick fox Auerbach~ with a ppe ll.ants to receive one.-third uf 
this trust estate in the event of the death of decedenfs son 
without issue+ 
Paragraph Fifth of the will provided: 
ult is my wili~ and 1 hereby direct~ that all of the 
shares of the capital stock of the Auerbach Company~ 
a t Jtah corporation~ which l own at the time of my 
deathj be offered for sale to mv brother~ Herbert S. 
Auerbach, who shall have and 'who is hereby given~ 
the exc I usive right to purchase the same within six 
months after the date of my death, for such pric~ 
not exceeding, however~ under any circumstances~ the 
book value of the s.am e, and under such terms--except·· 
jng as is herejnnfter limited to the time in \\·hicb pay~ 
ment is to be made---as my said brother shall .fix~ Upon 
my sai.d brother's declaration of his intention to acquire 
my satd stock~ the same is to be transferred and de-
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livered to him and, regardless of any book or other 
v a 1 ue of said stock~ his decision as to price, manner, 
method and terms of payment (subject to the limitation 
of time for payment hereinafter fixed) shall be com· 
pelled~ or called upon to show any books or statements 
of the corporation~ or give any explanation to anyone 
cancer ning the basis~ if any, upon v.,r hich my said 
brother has fixed the price) excepting, however~ that 
full payment of the price must be made within five 
years from the date of my death.'' 
Because .of the provision of Paragraph Fifth of the will 
involving the right of decedent's b rather Herbert to acquire 
at .any price he deemed proper the Auerbach Company stock, 
which was the principal as.set ~ the widow acting in her own 
capacity and as executrix entered into an agreement with 
Herbert which in short gave Herbert the power to vote the 
stock as a substitute £or his option to purchase the same+ The 
widow petitioned for court approval of this agreement, notice 
of which petition was mailed to appellants on February 4) 19 39~ 
On May 16 of 1940 the Vl idow :filed a report and petition 
en titled as follows: 
HREPOR1~ OF PAYMENT OF LEGACIES TO NEPH. 
EWS AND NIECES AND PETITION FOR 
CONFIRMATION; 
REPORT OF FACTS UNDERLYING LEGACIES TO 
SISTERS AND PETITION FOR INSTRUC-
TIONS; 
REPORT OF BORROWING TO PAY EXPENSES, 
CLAIMS) TAXES, ETC. AND PETITION FOR 
APPROVAL AND CONFIR:MATION; 
REPORT OF SALES AND PETITION FOR CON-
FIRMATION; 
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REPORT AND ACCOUNT OF ADMINISTRATION 
AND PETITION FOR SETTLEMENT~ 
PETITION FOR CONFIRMATION OF APPOINT~ 
M~NT OF TEST AMENT ARY GUARDIAN 
AND TRUSTEE; 
PETITION FOR DISTRIBUTION AND GENERAL 
RELIEF.'~ 
This report and petition set forth facts as to the value 
of the estate which would preclude appellants from recovering 
the specific legacies referred to in Paragraph Second of the 
~ill (but whi~ would not exclude appellants under another 
provision of the \V ill from recovery of at least one-third of 
decedenfs trust estate if his son died without issue) and 
petitioner therein stated ··that your petitioner is willing to 
abide by tb e construction of said will by this c:ou rt, .and the 
application thereto of the facts, which shall be found by the 
court in the premises * * * . '' The petition stated inter alia: 
HThat the net value of decedenfs estate as of May 
28, 1938, (date of death) as finaHy adjudicated under 
the highest appraisements (State and Federal) was a) 
follows: 
Real Estate -· -~~~·- ··~~--~~-~-- _ ---$ slooo.oo 
Stocks and Bonds ~L--~~--_ ·-- 4 7 3,1 00.34 
Cash and Cash Items ________ 4.291.28 
Mise e llan eou s Property __ _ _ 1 ~20 S. 7 6 
T 0 tal Gross Estate ~~- ~~L- -·~- -~U ~ u ~ ~. ~ ~ n ·-~ -.$486-,59 7.38 
From w hlch the f o 11 o \V 1 n Q deductions 'v ere and must 
be aJ lowed as Ia wful charges and disbursements: 
Funeral Expenses --------· .. .. $ -~~835.72 
Attorneys~ Fees _____ ~ ~ ~~-- ____ , 12, 5 00 .. 00 
Administration Expenses ~~ 55 8.8 8 
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Creditors Claims ______________ S ,972.88 
State Inheritance Tax r··~·· 44t329. 53 
FederaJ Estate Tax --· _________ 89t018.19 
Total (~harges and Disbursements ~-"~$156,215.20 
Net value of Estate under Para graph 
Second of the Will ·-·~~-~-~--~----------------$3 30,382.18 ,;, 
The petition further stated expressly that the value of 
the residence "v.as not included in the computation because it 
\vas owned jointly by the decedent and his widow and that 
the value o £ 1 if e insurance was not in eluded because all ins ur-
ance policies were payable and were paid to the widow as her 
sole and separate estate r 
The petition further stated that the expenses and outlays 
reducing the value of the estate could have been increased 
further by the executrlxts fee to which the widow '\Vnuld have 
been entitled (which would have been $4~ 397. 39) had she 
not waived itt by an allowance for family support (which was 
not claimed) and by the specific legacies to the nephews (total-
ing $14,000). 
Notice of ~t approval of appointment of testamentary trus-
tee and guardian~ confirmation of sale~ confirmation of legacies, 
etc.~~ was mailed to appellants on May 18, 1940. 
On May 21) 1940, the District Court entered an order 
to \V hich appellants in their statement of facts do not even 
allude. This order recited inter alia~ 
~o; 1. That all notices prescribed by law have been given. 
* * * * 
'!:3 .. That under the second paragraph of .said will, 
testator directed the payment of 1 egacies of Ten 
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Thousand Do 11 a rs ( $10,000) ~ to each of his sis-
ters, Bessie Auerbach, Selma A. Mohr~ Jen.rUe 
Auerbach and Madeline A .. Werner, upon condi~ 
tion~ however~ that the net val uc of his estate both 
at the time of his death and at the time of distribu-
tion of his es.ta te should amount to at least Three 
Hundred Fifty Thousand Do liars ( $3 50,000) ~ and 
be paid from the val uc of the estate in excess of 
said sum; that the net value of decedent's estate 
on May 28, 1938, (the date of death) was leS! 
than Three Hundred Fifty Thousand DoHm 
($350~000) ~ and did not exceed in net value the 
sum of Three Hundred Thirty Thousand Three 
Hundred Eight-two and 18/'100 DoJlars $33:0( 
3 8 2 .18) ; that said 1 egaci es would not be payable 
unless the net va I. ue of decedent~ s estate should 
equal or exceed Three Hundred Fifty Thousand 
Dollars ($350,000) as of May 28~ 1938; that the 
executrix has not recognized any liablity to pay 
said legacies and has not paid the same~ and js 
in doubt respecting her duty so to do. · 
* * * * 
The court ORDERS~ ADJUDGES AND DECREES:_ 
* * * That the executrix and the estate are exonera~~ 
from all liability to the sisters of testator hereinabove 
named on account of the conditional~ specific legacia 
of $1 0;.000 a warded to each of them under said last 
will for the reason that the condition upon which they 
were payable failed~ as hereinabove set forth, and they 
and each of them are barred and foreclosed from all 
rights to, or claims against the estate on account of 
said conditional, specific legacies~ but not of their coo· 
tingent rights under the Fourth provision of sgid will.'~ 
Distribution of the .residue of the estate to the trust was 
delayed several years pending repayments to the widow of 
funds which she had advanced the estate for payment of taxes. 
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The probate file further shows that a notice 'to£ hearing 
first account~ with petition for settl em en t thereof and for 
distribution of the residue of the estateH was mailed to appel-
lants on June 22, 1946~ 
A final decree of distribution to the tes tam en ta ry trustees 
\Vas entered by the court on July 3~ 1946. In addition the pro-
bate file contains certificates of mailing to appellants of each 
of nine peti tlons of the testamentary trustees for settlement 
of accounts. (All of the above is set forth in the probate .fi 1 e, 
which is an unnumbered part of the record on appeal.) 
Appellant Bessie Auerbach in her deposition) after the 
Court had required her to answer~ testified that her brother 
Herbert~ who had been asked by said Bessie Auerbach to 
handle her affairs (Apps~' Dep. p. 47, In 14-16) and upon 
"'··hom she relied to manage her affairs (Apps~' Dep. p. 10~ ln 
7-9) had told her in appellant Madge Werner's apartment 
in New York sometime during World War II and prior to 
Herbert .. s death on March 19~ 1945~ that Fred had left each 
of the appellants and Jennie Auerbach, now deceased~ $10,000 
( Apps.' Dep.. p. 47 ~ In 19 through p. 49, ln 19) and said 
appellant Bessie Auerbach thinks she mentioned this to her 
sisters (Apps.' Dep. p. 49) ln 21-24) ~ 
Appellant Selma Mohr testified in her de position that 
she wanted her brother Herbert to handle her affairs in Salt 
Lake and that he in fact did handle such a:ffa.irs and that she 
approved absolutely of what Herbert had done (Apps.' Dep~ 
P- 96, In 24 through p. 97, In 7). Said appellant further testified 
that she first 1 earned in either 1940) 1941 or 19 42 from one 
of her sisters that Herbert had told them that Frederick Auer-
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bach had left each of Pis sisters $10~000 (A pps.' Dep. p. 98, 
ln 6 through p. 99, ln 4). 
Appellant Madge Werner testified in her deposition that 
around 1940 her brother Herbert came to her house one night 
in New York and told her and her sister Jennie (now deceased) 
that Fred erick Auerbach had left each of the sisters $10,000 
(Apps~ 1 Dep. p. 120, In 11 through 22; Apps.' Dep. p. llS~ 
ln 19-2 5) . She further testified that she had told Herbert to 
handle her Salt Lake affairs and that he handled them and 
did so to her satisfaction (Apps.' Dep. p. 106, In 14-21). 
Appellants testified in their depositions tha.t after H erberf s 
death their Sait Lake legal matters were handled by Edwin 
M. Otterbourg and the then New York City firm of Otterbourg, 
Steindl er and Houston (now Otterbourg, Steindler~ Houston 
and Rosen) (Apps~' Dep. p+ 16~ In 10-21; p. 85, In 25~ p. 86~ 
In 2 8; p. 1 09 ~ In 2-6) . Appellants were represented in this 
action until appeal by tbe firm of Otterbourg, Steindler~ Houston 
and Rosen. 
On July 12 > 1946, said Edwin M. Otterbourg wrote a 
letter to James Ingebretsen~ attorney at law in Salt Lake Gty, 
who was counsel for the estate of Frederick S. Auerbacht & 
copy of which is set out as Appendix A of this brieC in which 
he incqui red as to the amount to be paid to the sis ter.s by reaS.Oil 
of the provision of Clause Second of the will providing for 
the bequest of $10,000 to the sisters ttout of the surplus of 
the net estate of $350,000+'! The file copy of Mr~ Otterbourg 
of such letter had upon it at the bottom, '' cc: Mrs. Wernet 
and Mr. Otterbourg testified in his deposition that a COPJ 
10 
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was sent to appellant Werner (Dep. of Otterbourg p. 89, ln 
23 through p. 90~ In 1). 
On July 18., 1946, James Ingebretsen replied to the letter of 
Mr. Otterbourg. A copy of the reply is set out a.s Exhibit '~B~' 
hereto. In this reply~ Mr. Ingebretsen explained that an 
order of the court made it impossible to make payment of 
the legacies to the sisters and stated that both he and Herbert 
Auerbach had exp Iaine d the matter to appellants and left 
with them copies of all pertinent papers. He offered to furnish 
any other information desired. 
Appellant Bessie Auerbach testified in her deposition that 
she made no inquiry as to the nature of her interest in tbe estate 
of Frederick S. Auerbach (Apps.) Depr 3S~ in 18-29 and 
p. 50) . Appellant Mohr testified similarly (A pps. 1 Dep~ p 
99-101). Appellant Werner testified similarly (Apps.' Dep. p. 
120, ln 19~ through p. 121, In 14). AppelJant Werner aJso 
testified that she knew her nephew received some money from 
the estate ( Apps~' Dep~ p. 124, ln 12-13) L Clause First of 
the wi 11 provided for the unconditional payment of legacies 
of $2:-000 each to seven nephews, including two sons of plain-
tiff Mohr, and the order of May 29, 1940, confirmed payment 
of these sums to these nephews. 
Appellant Bessie Auerbach testified in her deposition that 
she knows of no facts upon which she based the ailegations 
in her complaint that respondent Fannie F. A. Samuels inten-
tionally and deliberately presented an incorrect and misleading 
report and willfully concealed I rom appellants the true va I ue 
of the estate other than the statement from her counsel that 
said estate was undervalued and that the executrix made no 
11 
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disclosures to her (Apps.' Dep~ p. 35t ln 30 through p. 4o 
In 19). Appellant Mohr testified similarly (Apps.' Dep+ p. 
8 7 ln 2 9 through p. 94 ln 18) r Appellant Werner testifiecl 
similarly ( Apps~· Dep. p. 146~ ln l~ through p~ 155, In 9, 
esp. p+ 153, In 22 through P~ 154~ ln 7). 
Respondent Fannie Auerbach Samuels testified that J::ier-
bert had informed her that he had discussed the legacies with 
the sisters and had told them that they would not receive 
anything and that she had subsequently discussed the same 
matter with appellant Weroe:r and Jennie Auerbach in 1939 
or 1940 (Dep. of Fannie Auerbach Samuels, pr 41, In 16-24; 
ln 2 4) through p. 48 ~ ln 11 ~ p. 5 l ~ In 8-14) + 
Herbert Auerbach died on May 19~ 1945, and James Inge-
bretsen died on February 21~ 1954. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. Appellants~ reference to the Memorandum Opinion 
of the Trial Court is improper and should be disregarded·· 
2. The order of May 21, 1940, expressly holding that 
the legacies were not payable and exonerating the executrii 
from all liability is res judicata and can now be attacked only 
upon proof of extrinsic fraud, which is wholly absent £rom 
this record+ 
3. Appellants are barred by the Statute of Limitations and 
Laches~ 
4+ The will "vas proper I y construed by the court in its 
order of May 21~ 1940., and the legacies are not owed to ap-
pellants. 
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ARGUMENT 
I 
APPELLANTS' REFERENCE TO THE MEMORAN. 
DUM OPINION OF THE TRIAL COURT IS IMPROPER 
AND SHOULD BE DISREGARDED. 
A ppe llan ts make frequent reference to a document en-
titled nMemorandu1n Opinion" which appellants admit was 
entered aft~r entry of judgment. Appellants omitted from their 
quotation of this "opinion'' io their brief that portion ~·hich 
recites that this was done ·tat the request of counse 1 for 
pl aln tiffs,'' and further omits to inform this court tb at it ~ .. as 
obtained ex parte~ 
It is well .settled in Utah that an opinion of the trial court 
is not properly a part of the record and cannot be looked to 
to ascertain what the court found or decided~ and the judgment 
cannot be qualified or limited by any pfior oral or written 
opinion of the court or judge~ Gfand Central M. Co. t 1• Mam" 
ntoth M. Co. 1 29 Utah 49~ 83 Pa~. 648 ( 1905); Victot· 1\1. Co. 
t'. National Bank1 18 Utah 87} 55 Pac+ 72 ( 1898) + A fortiori, 
any subsequent statement by the court should have no effect 
on the judgment. Thus the Supreme Court of Washington, in 
striking from the record on a.ppeal a memorandum opinion 
written by the trial court after en try of judgment~ stated that 
at most it was '~nothing more than a colloquy bemreen court 
and counsel.n E! Romano Engineering Corp. t). State~ 8 Wa.sh. 
2d 670~ 113r P.2d 549 ( 1941), aff'd after rehearing 12 Wash. 
2d 736~ 120 P.2d 1008 ( 1942). 
The courts of our neighboring states have consistently bel d 
that memorandum opinions are not properly a part of a record 
13 
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on appeal. Robinson v. Herring~ 75 Ariz. 166~ 253 P.2d 347 
( 19 S 3) ; Terry v ~ Terry 1 7 0 Idaho 161, 213 P + 2d 9 06 ( 19 50) ; 
Lea County Fair AsJn. v. Elkan, 52 N.M~ 2SO:t 197 P+2d 228 
( 1948); Cltfford v. State, 20 Wash. 2d 527~ 148 P.2d 3:02 
( 1944). 
0 f course, the ··opinion j' merely states that ~ tw hile jt 
was not necessary to the determination of the issues of this 
casen the court was of the opini~n that the testator did not 
intend that state and federal taxes be nincluded' in computing 
the total amount of the estate. On its £ace this is a gra tuitoru 
aside. It was hardly a statement) as appellants as~ert, that the 
legacies ''were clearly payable (Apps~ Brf. p. 21) ~ Judgment 
was awarded unconditionally in favor of respondents. Re-
spondents have contended that they were entitled to judgment 
for several alternate reasons and, of course, it is well established 
that a judgment right in result will not be reversed even though 
the reasons stated for it are wrong. Tree -v. White1 110 Utah 
233~ 171 P.2d 398 ( 1946). This court has further held that 
where the conclusion reached by the trial court is correct~ 
though based on incorrect reasons, judgment will be affirmed 
on review. RaJmussen 1-'. Dar·is, 1 Utah 2d 96~ 262 P.2d 488 
(1953). 
Thus the sole issue before this court is whether~ on any 
theory~ the judgment should stand. Reference to the trial 
coUI t ~ s ex post facto memorandum is improper and superfluous. 
It should be stricken from the record and disregardedL 
II 
THE ORDER OF MAY 21~ 1940~ EXPRESSLY HOLD~ 
ING THAT THE LEGACIES WERE NOT PAYABLE AND 
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EXONERATING THE EXECUTRIX FROM ALL LIABIL-
ITY IS RES JUDICATA AND CAN NOW BE ATTACKED 
ONLY UPON PROOF Of EXTRINSIC FRAUD~ WHICH 
IS WHOLLY ABSENT FROM THIS RECORD. 
Appellants have conveniently ignored the court order of 
May, 1940. Yet it is apparent that a court of proper jurisdiction 
has already determined this question .some 19 years ago and 
this determination is res j udic at a and cannot be attacked col-
laterally, but only by a separate action on grounds of extrinsic 
fraud. The record here not only fails to establish extrinsic 
fraud~ but appellants' complaint does not even use the alle-
gation~ 
Appellants' sole objection to the order of 1940 is that 
they believe the court and the executrix were io error io making 
the computation, in that they improperly deducted taxes. Re~ 
spondents disagree and contend that the manner of compu· 
tation was correct. But this is beside the point. No one yet 
has advanced the theory that trj al courts are in f alii bl e-m is-
takes they can rna ke. But the law for good and sufficient 
reason has he 1 d that a partyJ s right to redress error is through 
appeal. Error does not constitute fraud~ nor can appellants 
contend that the court or anyone choosing to ma.ke inquiry 
was misinformed~ because the very record disproves this. The 
petition of executrix clearly sets forth the means of computation 
used (deducting ta.xes) and then requests instructions from 
the court. Appellants contend nothing more than an error by 
a court with proper jurisdiction, after due notice was given. 
Each of the appellants has testified that she knows of 
no facts upon which they based the allegations that respondents 
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t t inte0:tionall y and del ibera tel y presented an incorrect and 
misleading report and willfully concealed from plain tiffs the 
true value of the estate~t other than the statement from thejr 
then counsel that the estate was undervalued and that the 
executrix made no disclosures to them (see dep. refs. in State~ 
ment of Facts). 
lnteres ting t y ~ each of appellants vigorously denied that 
the executrix had ever discussed the question of I e gacies 'With 
them at all ( Apps.' Deps~ p~ 24~ 89 and 121), but in their 
brief a ppe U ants seek to find extrinsic fraud from the state-
ment of the executrix that in 1939 or 1940 she informed the 
appellants that she was sorry tb ey would not receive their 
legacies because crthere wasn't enough left for you girls to get 
each $1 0, 000~'' The executrjx is merely stating what the court, 
being fully informed of all the facts, did in fact .find. Appel~ 
lants admit that they know of no other facts. How this lone 
statement of bona fide concern, which appellants deny wa5 
made let alone relied upon~ can be tortured into extrinsic fraud 
is difficult to imagine. 
Appelants in desperate search for a motive make the 
fantastic assertion that there was a great plot between the 
executrix and Herbert to assure Herbert of management and 
control of the Auerbach store ( Apps. ~ Br£ ~ p. 23) . Aside 
from the facts that there is not a scintilla of evidence to support 
this and that Herbert's 1 ips are forever sealed there is for· 
., ' 
tuna tel y, con vine i ng \V r i tten evidence to the contrary+ There 
was no need at all for Herbert to exeru te the management 
contract with the executrix to gain voting con tro I of the store. 
The will gave him the clear right to purchase all of the stock 
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for a pittance. If there had been dark purpose (which it is 
rather surprising to hear appellants impute to their trusted 
b rather upon whom they relied implicitly) there would have 
been no need for Herbert to have u.sed tbis more complex 
means of achieving it. He could have had all of the stock 
for one dollar and the value of the estate v.rould have been 
depleted by over $300,000~ clearly making the legacies non-
pay able whether one deducted the taxes or not. 
This grasping at stra\vs shows the tenuous nature of 
appellants~ claims and the desperate way in which they attempt 
to satisfy the rigid tests th is court has es tab tished as necessary t() 
upset a prior order by collateral attack+ 
This law is well established. Once a will has been admitted 
to probate and the estate distributed and by decree the 
will interpreted, ~·it is not subject to a dillerent interpretation 
on collateral attack.H 1\Telson v. Howellsj 75 Utah 461, 286 
Pac 631, 632 ( 1930). This is consistent with the general rule 
(see 136 A.L.R~ 118{}-Rule of Res Judicata as Applied to 
Judicial Construction of a Will) . 
Probate actions are in rem. Where jurisdiction is properly 
.acquired~ and the appellants here concede this (R. p+ 1), one:os 
only remedy from a decree from the probate court is by appeal 
or attack for extrinsic fraud. This rule is clearly stated in 
Weyant v~ Utah Savings & T1ust Company, 54 Utah 181, 
182 Pac. 189, 197 ( 1919) ~ wherein the court stated: 
nThis court is committed to the doctrine contended 
for by counsel for appetlantl namelyJ that probate pro~ 
ceedings are in rem, and that where the statutory 
notice has been given all who are interested in the 
17 
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estate are bound by all orders or decrees duly entered 
in the particu tar case, and that., ordinarily, ~e only 
remedy is by direct appeaL Barrette v. W httneyJ 36 
Utah 574~ 106 Pac. 522; 37 L.R.A. (NS) 368. Thi5 
court has also held that judgments and decrees entered 
by courts of competent jurisdiction) where jurisdiction 
of the subject of the action and of the person has been 
1 e gall y acquired, can only be assai 1 ed on direct appea.] 
or in equity for extrinsic as contra-distinguished from 
intrinsic £ r a ud.' ~ 
In fact~ after initial notices for appointment of the persona! 
representative have been issued~ no others are necessary, but 
are merely given for the convenience of the parties in interest. 
This court has clearly so held in Barrette v. Whitne_)1, supra. 
Nor does. it rna tter that the order of 1940 was not a .final 
decree of distribution. This order could not even have been 
attar ked in 1946 at the time of final distribution. Ral ei g IJ J 
Estatet 48 Utah 128, 158 Pac. 705 ( 1915), holds that the settle-
ment of accounts, whether of a final or intermediary account, 
is conclusive as to a I 1 items contained therein~ 
Appellants object to the forms of the notice of the 1940 
petition. This court can take judicial notice of the fact that jn 
Utah probate notices are prepared and sent by the probate 
clerk) not by the persona I representatives~ and any inadequacy 
in phras eo Ia gy could not be attributed to the executrix in 
any event. 
Moreover~ 7 5-14-12 U CA 19 53 provides that if a decree 
of the probate court shows that due notice was given~ the 
decree shall be cone 1 u si ve evidence of that fact. The o £der 
of 1940 determined that due notice had been given+ Thus there 
18 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
is no me rj t in appellants' attacks upon the alleged inadequacy 
of the notice mailed to them for the hearing on the petition 
Ul 1940. 
Appellants cite 75-14-23 UCA 1953. This statute is merely 
dec lara tory of the established rule. This is clearly shown by 
In Re Rice~s Estate~ lll Utah 428) 182 P~2d lll ( 1947) ~ 
\\·herein the son of the deceased was informed by his sister~ 
the executrix~ at the courthouse on the day of the hearing 
of the decree of distribution that there was no need for him 
to appear, as the executrix waul d take care of his interests. 
In fact the petition drawn by the executrix failed to. take care 
of his interests in that it did not disclose certain property which 
the son should have received and accordingly the decree did 
not give to the son certain property to which he wa.s entitled 
under the wilL Within a yea.r after the decree the son com~ 
menced his action. The court cited 75-14-23 UCA 1953 (then 
102-14-23 UCA 1943) which it stated Hsets out a remedy to 
the person so injured~ 1 ' The court then carefully set £ orth the 
requirements of proof necessary to constitute a cause of action 
under this statute (i.e~ that extrinsic fraud must be shown), 
citing a~ definitive on the question of extrinsic fraud the case 
of United States t-'. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61~ 25 L. Ed. 93 
(1878). 
Appellants have quoted from this case (A p ps~ 1 Bf. p. 2 7) 
but have omitted certain of the examples of extrinsic fraud 
which are helpful in defining what the court had in mind. Thus 
the United States Supreme Court included as examples) in 
add[tion to those cited by appellants, the following: 
'' . . . When an attorney fraudulently or without 
authority assumes to represent a party and connives at 
19 
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his defeat; or where the attorney regularly employed 
corruptly s e 1 1 s out his clien f s interest to the otber side 
-these and similar cases which show that there has 
never been a real contest in the trial or hearing of the 
case, are rea sons for which a new suit may be sustained 
to set aside and annul the former judgment or decree 
and open the case for a new and a fair hearing~~~ 
It should be apparent that these examples or the facts 
in Rice do not present a 4 'situation practically identical with 
the instant case" (Apps.' Brf. p. 2?). Even if one torture~ 
the executrix"'s expression of concern as a statement of fa~ 
it is clear that this is not a case, as was Rice, where tbe execu. 
trix said one thing to a beneficiary and represented anothe{ 
to the court through her petition. Nor should one lose sight 
o £ the fact that the action in Rice was commenced within a 
year from the entry of the decree, no~ 17 years later as io 
the instant case~ Appellants further f ai I to point out that ffi 
the second appeal of this case-Rice v. Rice, 117 Utah 27~ 
212 P.2d 685 ( 1949)-the court pointedly asked: ncan ]t 
be said that any executrix desiring to carry out the terms of 
the will under such condition would not at lea5t petition the 
P to bate Court for an interpretation of the will ? ·? ( p. 690). 
Jn the case now before this court this is exactly what the 
executrix did, fully disci osing all of the facts in issue. Conr 
.scientious counsel, advising the client after the above decision~ 
would certain I y not have ad vised anything more. If what the 
Auerbach"'s executrix did is not sufficient to remove the threat 
of long-delayed all ega tjons of f r a ud1 then this court is i~ 
effect saying that the time-honored practice of naming the 
widow executrix of one's estate is fraught \Yith too great peril 
for one safely to assume .. 
20 
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The facts necessary to constitute extrinsic fraud are only 
of the most extreme kind~ and must be proved by ctear and 
convincing evidence. Tiller v. Norton, 123 L;tah 49, 253 P.2d 
618 (1953 ). For example even perjury is not extrinsic fraud. 
Anderson 1-'. State1 65 Utah 512, 238 Pac. 557 ( 1925). Even 
tb e use of fraudulent documents is intrinsic as opposed to 
extrinsic fraud+ Chisoltn v. HoNSe, 160 F.2d 632 ( 10 Cic, 
194 7) T In that case the Court of Appeats said: 
HFraud is regarded as extrinsic or collateral where 
it prevents a party from having a trial or from present~ 
ing his cause of action or his defense, or induces him 
to \vithdraw defense~ or operates upon matters per. 
taining not to the judgment itself, but to the manner 
in \Vhich it was procured.~) (p~ 643) .. 
Rule 60 (b) of the Utah Rules of Gvil Procedure may 
have restricted the r lgh ts of the appellants to attack a final 
judgment even more severely .. The rule provides for relief from 
a judgment procured by fraud only by a motion within three 
m?'nths after judgment .. The rule further provides uthis rule 
does not limit the power of the court to entertain an inde-
pendent action to relieve a party from a judgment~ order or 
proceeding, or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court.'' 
It may well be argued that this restricts any independent 
action to facts ~vhich would constitute a fraud upon the court 
as opposed to a fraud upon the parties. 
Appellants cite Benson v. Ande-rson) 10 Utah 135, 37 
PacT 256 ( 1894). There the widow, who received nothing 
under an intestate distribution~ was an old Danish 'voman, 
who had a very poor knowledge of the English language and 
who depended whoHy on others foe information as to her 
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rights in the probate. The widow of Benson was of necessit1 
dependent on others for information as to her rights. It js 
clear that appellants~ ladies of means and all of whom had 
received property through Herbert's probate .and one of whom 
had acted as executrix for at least nvo estates (Apps.' Dep. 
p. 1 0 7 and 112) t and whose Utah business affairs were handled 
through their lltah accountant and New York counsel (Apps.~ 
Deps. p. 16, ln 10-21; p~ 85~ ln 25; p~ 86, In 28; p~ 109~ Ins 
2 through 6) hard! y fit the category of illiterate agrarian 
immigrants. Moreover~ as each of appellants has stoutly 
denied that the executrix ever comniunica ted to them at all 
( Apps.' Deps. p. 24, p. 89 and p. 121) ~ it is clear that they 
did not depend at all on the statement which the executrix 
cl arms she made to them. Even more significant is that under 
the undisputed facts, the probate court in Benson had clearly 
v io Ia ted a statu tory mandate requiring distribution to the 
widow, as this court pointed out (p. 257). Under the facts m 
BenJ on~ the pro bate (Ou rt under no circumstances could have 
been correct. This is wholly di.H erent from the instant, case 
where the Probate.. Court was faced, not with a sta~tory 
mandate, but with a -question of interpretation u 1 timatel y turn-
ing on the testatoris intention~ where the Probate Court could 
have been correct, and where, as respondents contendt !r 
was correct. This distinction was pain ted out by this court in 
Anderson ~·. State, supra~ where it said~ ~ 4 It must satisfactorily 
appear that but for the fraud the judgment must have been 
otherwise: not that it might have been otherwise,, (p. S 59). 
A ppe 11 ants c 1 te certain authorities from other jurisdictions. 
In Bacon r·. Bacon, 1.50 CaL 477, 89 Pac .. )17 ( 1907), an error 
was rna de in reading the will as to the amount of particular 
2.2 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
legacies. As the court stated ··This mistake was carried into 
all subsequent proceedings" (p. 318) . HThe obvious result 
\vas the decision of the court, based on the uncontested facts set 
forth 1n the petition for di5tribution'~ (p. 323). In Harkins 
v. Fielder, 1 SO Cal. App. 2d S28~ 310 P.2d 423 ( 1957) ~ one 
brother executed a petition to the court falsely representing 
that he was the sole heir at law of decedent, and pursuant 
thereto .. after probate~ the court made distribution to him 
alone. 
One need go no further than appellantst own quotation 
from Appeal of a~ Neil, 55 Conn. 409~ 11 Atl. 857 ( 1887), 
to see that the decision was express 1 y based upon the admin · 
istratrix '"[intentionally concealing such knowledge from 
the Probate Courf~ (Apps .. ~ Brf. p. 29). In tllorris tJ. Mull, 
110 Ohio S.R. 623~ 144 N.E. 436 (1924), the mother had 
left a legacy to her daughter conditioned upon the daughter 
claiming it within two years and then to her son. The executa r w 
son~ in the final accounting, had represented to the court "I 
do not know the address of Myra Mull and have not heard 
from her I or more than 4 years past,' r despite the fact that he 
had been in correspondence with her and her attorney about 
the probate of their father~ s estate during this period., and 
had not even informed her of their mother1S death. 
Appellants Wlq uestionabl y can cite many more cases to 
the same effect, each involving untruthful representations to 
the court. But no torturing o £ the facts in the instant case can 
fit them into this category. The executrix here made full dis-
closure of all facts in her petition. 
At most appellants here argue that an error of the court, 
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resulting after full disclosure to the court, and after proper 
notice~ amounts to extrinsic fraud justifying upsetting a prjor 
decree. If this be the law all personal representatives act for-
ever at their periL Indeed what more will the law require an 
executrix to do? Will any court require her to do more than 
make full disclosure~ request the court to interprett give proper 
notice~ and personally notify other interested parties of the 
conclusions of her attorney and Herbert~ which the court 
confirmed ? \\1 e submit that the question answers itself. The 
stability of our legal system requires that such decisions stand 
unless attacked by timely appeal. 
III 
PLAINTIFFS ARE BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS AND LACHES~ 
Respondents submjt that the statute of limitations com· 
m enced to run in this action at the date of the en try of the 
courfs order of May 16, 1940, or in any event at the time of 
the decree of distribution on July 3, 1946~ Under either date~ 
the action is barred now~ 
Respondents further contend that the undisputed facts 
show laches as a matter of law~ 
Appellants claim that the :fiduciary relation occupied b}· 
the widow as executrix precludes and estops her and respond-
ents from raising these issues now. But Utah courts have 
clear I y held that the statute of limitations and 1 aches maJ 
be raised by those in fiduciary ca pacici es~ 
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Thus is KamaJ Securities Co. v. '[ aylor, 119 Utah 241., 
226 P.2d 111 ( 1950)) the court stated at page 118: 
44 
••• but viewing tbe charge in its entirety tt 1s 
clearly one of breach of a fiduciary duty 'vhich would 
mean that the £our· year statute of I imitations would 
be applicable . ~ . ~~ 
Wood lJ. Fox, 8 Utah 380} 32 Pac. 48 ( 1893), was a Utah 
.action brought by a plaintiff to enforce a trust. The court 
held tbat the claim was barred both by laches and by the statute 
of limitations. This decision was affirmed by the United States 
Supreme Court ( 166 U+S~ 637, and 166 U+S+ 648). 
From these examples alone) it is clear that there is no 
merit in appellants' claim that by reason of the fiduciary rela-
tionship per s e respondents are precluded from raising either 
the statute of 1 imitations or laches. This is not only the law in 
Utah~ but is true generally. Thus!' in 54 C+J.S. p+ 152, Limita-
tions of Actions, § 179~ it is said: 
t
4Fid11ciary relationJ. While there arc some decisions 
holding that the rutc governing tbe exemptions of trusts 
from the running of statutes of Jim ita tions applies not 
only to express, but also to other fiduciary relations, 
it is generally he 1 d that mere fiduciary or confi.den tial 
relations between parties to a suit~ with respect to the 
matters in controversy, will not per se prevent the 
running of the statute. t ~ 
As some au tho ri ties make a dis tine tion of this is sue be-
tween the trustee of an express trust and one in some other 
.fiduciary capacity, this should be clarified .. 
c
4As a general rulej the only class of trusts not affected 
by the statute of limitations is composed of those 
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technical and continuing trusts which are not cognizable 
at law, but which fall within the pro per, peculiar, and 
exclusive jurisdiction of courts of equity.'~ 54 C.J.S. p. 
1 S 1 ~ Limitations of Actions, § 179 ~ 
The Res ta tern en t of T :rusts states unequivocal i y: 
'~Sec. 6~ An executorship or an adminis.tratorship 
is not a trust." 
The issue before the court therefore is not whether the 
fiduciary can r a.ise the defense of the statute of limitations and 
laches, but rather when does such a statute start to run ? There 
are two lines of authority on this question. One line holds that 
the statute starts to tun Vitrhen the fiduciary repudiates the trust 
relationship. The other holds that the statute starts to run 
when the beneficiary becomes entitled to assert his rightsl 
which in the case of a.n at tern pt to impose a constructive trust 
for unpaid legacies would be at the time of settlement of the 
final account and the decree o~ distribution. Respondents con· 
tend that this action is bar red under either test by reason of 
the court order of May 21, 1940., which was an unequivocal 
repudiation of any liability to the appellants for payment of 
the legacies and a discharge of the executrix from .any respon-
sibility to make such payment. 
The Utah courts have clearly accepted the ~-=repudiation·· 
tb eory as to v.,t hen the statute of limitations commences to 
run against a fiduciary. In AnderJon v. Cerco11e, 54 Utah 34~, 
180 Pac 586 ( 1919), the court held that the statute of limi-
tations v.:ould start to run against a resulting trustee when 
the facts showed that the trustee had repudiated the relationr 
ship or had done acts inconsistent with it 
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In ThontaJ z_.·. Glendinning) 13 Utah 47~ 44 Pac. 652 
( 1896) J an action was commenced to enforce a trust resulting 
from money which p 1aintlff had given the defendant~ The 
court stated the rule -qutte clearly in this case at page 654: 
"It is well settled that, as between trustee and cestui 
que trust, the statute of limitations does not operate~ in 
cases of express or direct trusts~ so 1 ong as such trusts 
continue. But \\-·hen the trustee denies the trust~ and 
assumes ownership of the trust property, or denies 
his liability or obligation under the trust relation, in 
such a manner that the cestui que trust has actual, or 
even conJtructive, notice of the repudiation of the 
trust, then the statute of limi ta tio n s at taches, and 
be gins to run from that time, for such denial or .adverse 
claim is an abandonment of the fiduciary character in 
\vhich the trustee has stood to the property.'' (Emphasis 
added.) 
As the o rde.r of 19 40 was clear 1 y a denial of liability or 
obligation under the :fiduciary relationship~ the only possible 
issue remaining is w beth er a p pe 1 lants had at least constructive 
notice of this a.ct. Our Supreme Court in Burninghan'l t·. Burke, 
67 Utah 90~ 245 Pac+ 977~ 46 A.L.R. 466 ( 1926) ~ at page 983 
of the P aci fie Reporter defines laches as constituting unreason-
able delay either in discovering the facts or in f ai] in g to act 
upon them; and if there are facts known v..~ hich would put 
a person of ordinary prudence on inquiry~ he will be charged 
with such knowledge. 
In Wood t. Fox (supra)~ where the court heJd that the 
action against the alleged trustee ~v.as barred both by the statute 
of limitations and laches~ the court pointed out ~'he [plaintiff] 
could have found out by inquiry~ and he says he did not make 
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any'' ( p. 51) . The court a I so pointed out that the plaintiff 
and defendant had had frequent meetings and had at those 
tirne5 tnade no claim for his interest in the trust property. 
In S[ofts v. Crouchj 24 Utah 377, 67 Pac. 1068 (1902), 
the plain tiff~ a dminis tra tor of a deceased locator of a mining 
claim~ s ucd to impose upon the paten tee a trust for the benefit 
of tbe estate of the deceased locator. The court held that the 
evidence supported a finding that the locator had completely 
. conveyed his interest. How ever, discussing the question of 
whether the action was barred, the court pointed out that many 
years ear I i er there ~~as litigation over the property in question 
and at that time the decedent had not claimed an interest in 
the property. The court pointed out that the proceedings in 
that litigation were public and stated that under the circumT 
stances, the unexplained deiay and laches would be con-
sidered sufficient reason for refusing the relief prayed for. 
The court,. in discussing laches, pointed out that the death 
of the principal witness or witnesses was a factor to be con-
sidered in applying the doctrine. 
Felknef v. Dooleyj 28 Utah 236, 78 Pac. 365 ( 1904), 
was an opinion after rehearing. Ea. r lier in the s arne case ( 2 7 
Utah 350, 75 Pac. 854) the Supreme Court had held that under 
the facts~ the statute of limitations did not run. This was 
modified in the Later opinion after a re-examination of the 
£acts~ the court ho 1 ding that the records showed that for 
nearly ten years prior to the commencement of the action 
plaintiffs had knowledge of the fact that Dooley had denied 
the trust. The court stated at page 366: 
•tAnd the authorities uniformly hold that when a 
2R 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
trustee of an ex press trust denies the trust and assumes 
tb e a bso 1 u te ownership of the trust property, and this 
c I aim of owner ship is brought home to the cestui que 
trust, a cause of action exists in favor of the latter from 
the time he receives notice of the repudiation of the 
trust by the trustee, and the statute of 1 im ita ti ons 
begins to run from that time.}, 
An annotation at 54 A.L.R. 2d 13) entitled t~What Con-
stitutes Sufficient Repudiation of Express Trust by Trustee to 
Cause Statute of Liml tat ions to Run,·· discu s.ses the question 
of constructive notice, and states: 
· ~ . . ~ A greater amount of authority shows that 
under appropriate circumstances) and particulat'IJ u)here 
the rcpudiative act or instrument is a matter of public 
recordj the beneficiary of an express trust may be charge-
a.b l e with cons true tive or imp lied notice of the r epu dia-
t.ion thereof by the trustee, with the result that from 
the time he is chargeable 'vi th such notice, the statute 
of limitations will run a gai:1st him in favor of the 
trustee\" (p~ 36). (Emphasis added.) 
This court in Ruthrauff r. Silver King Western Min. & 
Mill Co.~ 95 Utah 279') 80 P.2d 338 ( 1938), held that an 
alleged trustee) whether of an express or constructive trustj 
could assert the statute of limitations and laches after repudir 
a tin g the fiduciary relationship by publicly or no to riousl y 
setting up an inconsistent claim. The court held in that case 
that an alleged trustee~ .s conveyance of an inter est greater than 
he owned, which can only be good by passing the equitable 
jnterest of beneficiadest was such a repudiation, and that due 
record notice of the conveyance was enough to commence the 
running of the statute. In an ear 1 y Utah federal case, Curtis 
tJ. Lakin} 8 Cir, Utah) 94 Fed. 251 ( 1899)) the court held 
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that 'vhere a person "V~t'ho allegedly held a portion of a mining 
claim as a trustee for others, and then by his conduct. began 
treating the claims as his own, laches would commence from 
the time of commencement of such inconsistent conduct. The 
the court held the claim barred by laches despite the fact that 
the statute of limitations would not have run for another t~vo 
years. 
1 n considering \'It' beth er appellants had at 1 east constructive 
no ti.ce that the executrix had denied liability, one should con-
sider these facts which are admitted by the appellants: 
1 + Appellants knew that the will contained. a provision 
giving them each $10 ~000. 
2. The nephews of the decedent each had received $2,000 
prior to May. 1940, and this included the two sons of appellant 
Mohr~ Appellant Werner also knew of these payments. 
3. The petition and order of the court are. public records~ 
always open to inspection. 
4. The notice of such hearing mai ted to appellants \Vas 
held due notice by the court in its order of May 211 1940. The 
Utah code provides that this is conclusive evidence of tba t fact 
(Title 75-14-12 UCA 1953). 
5. Appellants in 1946 received notice of a hearing on 
executrix's petition for a final accounting and distribution of 
the residue. 
6. Appellantst attorney made inquiry by letter as to pay· 
ment of the legacies in July of 1946, a copy of which was sent 
to appellant \Xlerner, and the attorney for the estate repliea 
30 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and clearly and unequivocally stated that the legacies would 
not be paid and stated that both he and Herbert ( nO\V both 
deceased) had informed appellants of this, discussed it with 
them, and left them copies of all pertinent papers. 
7. Appellants knew they did not receive the legacies, and 
yet from at least 1940 to 195 7 ~ they made no inquiry at all 
to anyone+ 
8. The executrix contends she too discussed this matter 
with the sisters~ (Certainly a s ta temen t that t~ e a ppell ants 
would not receive th~ir legacies is not one that would lull any-
one in to a s t.a te of non· inquiry) + 
9- The notices given under the probate proceedings and 
the probate order are of course in themselves suff ici en t notice 
to appellants. 
Can there be any question that any reasonable person 
under these facts would have made inquiry? During this 17-
year delay, both the attorney for the estate and Herbert, the 
confidan~ a.nd financial advisor and manager of both appellants 
and the widow,* have died. The two architects of the probate 
are no longer here to justify their actions. Nor do appellants 
contend that they were misled into thinking they would receive 
their le gad es at some future time. Indeed, one of their a ppa.ren t 
"Appellants con sisten tl y refer to the executrix's brother-in-law~ 
Herbert~ as "Fanniets confidant.t' He was equally the confidant 
of his sisters, the appellants. There was nothing sinister about 
this. It v;as quite natural. Herbert was the onJy surviving male 
adult in a family with extensive business interests~ As appellants 
admitted without hesit.1tion, he \Vas also the one \\··ho handled 
their Utah business aHairs and whom they trusted absolu tei y ~ 
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objections is that the executrix did not communicate with them 
at all. This is denied, but even if true, it seals the door of 
laches even more firmly. 
In jurisdictions ~vhere courts of equ1ty and la\v have 
concurrent jurisdiction (as in Utah) ·~if the statute would bar 
an action at law it \vill be equally a bar in equity., the mode 
of relief making no difference~" 34 Am. Ju.r. p. 55~ Limitation 
of Actions, § 59. Under these circwnstances~ laches can only 
restrict a maximum period fixed by statute. So while the facts 
c 1 ear J Y' sho \V the laches of appellants~ as the statute o £ limi-
tations has clearly run, this is merely an additional ground 
for upholding the trial court. 
Another quite respectable line of authority hoi ds that in 
the case of a c iairn ant of a 1 e gacy or distributive share of an 
estate~ the statute of 1 imitations commences to run against 
such claimant from the time of settlement of the fina.I account 
and the making of the decree of final distribution~ This line 
of a nth or i ty is very carefully ana 1 y zed in a recent 10-page 
decision of the Supreme Court of Wyoming> Wilson 11. Mar-
tinez, 76 Wyo. 196~ 301 P.2d 785 ( 1956) r This was a claim 
by a daughter who while still a minor had been a warded a 
portion of her father .. s estate by the decree of distribution. 
The daughter brought an action against the estate of her 
mother~ 1;\rho had acted as administratrix of the fa.ther .. s estate, 
for recovery of her distr ibu ti ve share of her father's estate, 
claiming her mother breached her trust as administratrix. The 
d ef en dant claimed the bar of the statute of limitations, and 
the court held that the claim was bar redr As the decree of dis-
tribution granted the amount claimed (unlike our case where 
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the dtt:ree expressly repudiated the legacy) the defendants 
could not, of course~ claim that the deer ee was its e If a re pud i-
a tio n) but the defendants did successfully maintain that the 
statute commenced to run upon terminatoin of the fiduciary 
relation, even without repudiation, u pan entry of the decree 
of distribution. 
The analysis of authorities made by the Wyoming court 
is extreme 1 y thorough~ Since appellants have cited at 1 ength 
from certain California cases~ it is helpful to quote from the 
Wyoming courf s summary of the California authorities: 
tt * * * This makes it clear that in California the 
trust resulting from the relationship of exerutrix or 
administrator to the legatee or heir ~7a s not C( )nsi de red 
to be such an express voluntary trust as requires a 
trustee to repudiate the trust in order to start the run-
ning of the statute of Jimitation~n ( p. 799). 
The court was influenced by the existence in its statutes of 
Section 6-2 3 06 W + C~S+ 194 5) which is almost id ent lea 1 to our 
7S·12·8 Gtah Code Annotated 1953. The court states at page 
800: 
nrn studying the foregoing a.s well as a great number 
of other cases from different jurisdictions, some of 
which have been cited by counsel and some of which 
have been discovered through our O\Vn research~ it 
appears that in those jurisdictions which have statutes 
.similar to our § 6-2306, W.C.S. 1945~ giving dis· 
tr i bu tees a right of action at la \V for recovery of their 
shares of an estate, it is being held that statutes of 
limitation rna y be pleaded in bar to actions brought 
by 1 e gatees to distr i bu tees against personal rep resen ta-
tives to recover their distr ihutive shares of an estate. t j 
The court concludes at page 801 : 
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nDespite the confusions which were bound to result 
from such. indiscriminate descriptions being applied 
to trusts, there has emerged in most instances some~ 
thing akin to agreement in this-that statutes of_ 1 imt ~ 
ta tion will run against the claimant of a legacy or 
distributive sha rc when ( 1) the rep resen ta tive either 
expressly or impliedly repudiates the trust~ ( 2) the 
trusteeship is otherwise terminated. t' 
The court at page S 0 3, uneq ui vocally sta. ted that the 
plaintiff \Vas charged VIr' ith know ledge of a decree which was 
a public record: 
··"Whether or not the plaintiff knew of her inheri-
tance was a question of fact. The judgment favorable 
to plaint iff requires that we consider it settled that 
she did not actually have that koowl edge~ This, how-
ever, did not relieve the p l a.in tiH of a duty to act. 
The la \~' charged plaintiff with knowledge of matters 
disclosed by public records. Wben plain tiff became of 
age the la\v presumes her capacity to kno~ .. whether she 
had received any benefit from her deceased father~s 
estate+ It then bee am e her 0 \V n responsibility to ascer r 
tain whether she was en ti tied to receive any in her ita nee 
or l e gar.y from his estate and, with the pub 1 ic records 
evidencing that fact available to her~ she was charged 
in lav.·· \vith that knowledge. See Lyerly t-'. YeadonJ 
1937) 183 S.C. 256, 190 S~E .. 73 7. 
•4:There must be an end to litigation and disputes and 
it is just as important that there com c a time when 
u nasserted rights must be he 1 d to be forever I ost. The 
more complex and involved our civilization and \vays of 
life become~ the more necessary it is that the business 
and affairs of people be allowed to proceed without a 
sword of Damocles hanging interminably over their 
heads in the form of possible unannounced claims~ long 
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delayed in their a.s serti on and whicht if time 1 y prose~ 
cuted, might have been defeated upon merit~'r 
Further~ while pointing aut that plain tiff \Vas a minor at 
the time of the entry of the decree and that ~n certain cases it 
is impossible that know ledge of a decree would in fact come 
to a child~ the court stated at page .S 04: 
qBut~ on the other hand~ justice also requires that 
some protection be given to the person or interest 
against whom such a right is claimed. The person 
may die~ witnesses may die or pass beyond reach~ docu-
ments and effects be destroyed or lost and, in conse-
quence, ~~ith the passing of time) the persons and the 
ev ldence which were once available to make defense 
against_ state claims are lost and gone forevec" 
It is su bm ( tted that the analysis in this opinion presents 
the alternative argument as to tbe running of the statute most 
persuasively and that it is consistent VoJT i th the 1 a w of the rna j o ri ty 
of j ur lsdictlons. 
Under either theory (i.e~ repudiation or the time of entry 
of the decree) plain tiffs are here clear I y bar red. 
Appellants characterize the defense of statute of limita-
tions and laches as a nmere technicality~n Aside from the fact 
that this court and othets have~ to the contrary, classified such 
defenses as beneficial, which the courts ~T i 11 view with favor 
for sound reasons of public policy~ one need only see the 
dilemma a tria 1 coUit "·ould be in if it were asked at this 
late date to attempt to reappraise the valuation of this estate 
to determine if it had a net value of more than $350,000. 
Such a holding would open up a Pandora's Box filled only 
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with dead ·witnesses and stale evidence. Any revaluation could 
be little more than guess-work. 
Appellants contend that the statute did not begin to run 
until their New York counsel examined the probate file in 
] un e of 19) 7. By this lo _g ic:~ if counsel had not examined the 
file~ the statute v.r•ou I d still not even have be gun to run. By this 
logic, the claim would never be barred. This result is a legal 
absurdity. Appellants lay great stress on the words used by 
the executrix in her conversation in 1940. Clearly this would 
have been no problem if the executrix had meret y informed 
appellants that they would not receive their legacies. But, 
argue appellants, because she went further and told them wh;~ 
they would not receive them (i.e 'l ~~there wa.sn ~ t enough left'') t 
the 5 ta tute is to 11 ed forever. If this is the law, then a personal 
representative is better oft to make no disclosure at ail. Such 
a result is neither sound in logic nor in Ia w ~ a.nd these con ten~ 
tions should be rejected. 
IV 
THE WILL WAS PROPERLY CONSTRUED BY THE 
COURT IN ITS ORDER OF MAY 21~ 1940) AND THE 
LEGACIES ARE NOT OWED TO APPELLANTS~ 
Appellants by the use of such words as t~clearlyu and 
1:
1 properly ~ 1 try hard to convince the court that the manner of 
computation used by the court in 1940 was erroneous. Re· 
s pond en ts disagree. The sole dispute is whether the term f ~ ~1 t= t 
value of my estate'J as used in Paragraph Second of the will 
should be a figure from which is deducted estate and inheri~ 
tance taxes. 
36 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
·rhere is no automatic answer to this problemr It is a 
question of construction of this particular 'vi 11. Section 7 4- 2 · 1 
LTCA 1953 provides nTestator~s intentions govern-the will is 
to be construed a ceo rdin g to the intention of the testator~~' 
Authorities from other courts interpreting other wilJs thus 
have limited v a. I u e ~ 
Let us look at this will and the surrounding facts. Decedent 
was a business man of means. He died leaving a \Vidow and 
one son. He 1 eft the principal portion of his estate in trust 
for those natural objects of his bounty. He also wanted to 
remember his sisters, which he did in two ways. First~ by 
making them contingent remainderman of a portion of the 
residue in trust and second;) by stating that he v.rould like to 
give them $1 0~000 apiece in the event, but only in the event, 
that the net value of his estate exceeded $350,000. Why 
would he have picked such a .figure? 
Certainly it is most logical to assume he picked this because 
he wished at least this sum to go into the trust for his wife 
and child and to assure th€m of income in any event from 
a minimum sum certain. A minimum of $350,000 at. 5% \vould 
,give an annual income of $17.,500. 
Appellants contend that decedent intended to disregard 
taxes in computjng this minimum protection. 1~o ~ccept this 
argument one must assume that the d ecedcnt did not intend 
to assure his family a fixed minimum nest egg, but rather a 
com p 1 etel y in de terminable one fl uctua tirig wit b the character 
of decedent t s as sets and the a pp I icab 1 e tax rates in effect at 
the time of his death. It is inconceivable that the te5tator \'/auld 
not be cognizant of the large part taxes played in diminishing 
37 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
one's estate~ If he had wished that Hnet value of my estate'~ 
be computed without regard to taxes, he surely Vt;rould have 
said so. Respondents contend that their interpretation is. cer-
tainly more reasonable. 
Moreover, the other facts show the complete good faith 
of the approach used. Other means were certainly available 
to bring the net value below $350,000) if the estate~s repre-
sentatives had v,.~ished this. The principal asset of the estate, 
221} · ~harc5 of the Auerba(h Company stock~ was) in the peti-
tion of the executrix~ given a value o £ $140.00 per share, 
although at the time of the death of the testator the value 
of the stack of the estate was extreme! y speculative, by reason 
of Herbert~ s right to buy it at any price be deemed fit~ Indeed~ 
good argument could be made that at the time of decedent's 
death the stock of Auerbach Company had no value at alJ to 
the estate. 
As previously stated~ in exchange for the executrix'5 
granting Herbert certain voting and sale rights to that stock 
Herbert did subsequently waive the right to purchase the stock1 
but in that agreement approved by the court on February 1 S, 
19 3 9, it '""as a greed that the stock \Vas worth only $100,00 per 
share. At such an evaluation the value o£ the total estate would 
be $88, 52 0 1 ess than the values used by the court when it 
determined that the legacies should not be paid~ Moreover, 
in computing values for purposes of deciding wbether the 
legacies should be paid petitioner and the court used the value 
o £ the assets for federal and state~ estate and inheritance tax 
purposes ( $486J 59 7 ~ 3 8) rather than the considerably lower 
v.al u e placed upon the estate by the court -a ppoiot:OO a ppralsen 
($403~ 738+64). 
38 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Moreover, the will directs first of all the payment of 
'
4 debts+ I· Appellants apparently con tend that estate and in-
heritance taxes are not debts w j thin the meaning of this pro-
vision. Ample authority justifies the contention that estate and 
inher.itance taxes are ndebts.n Appellants concede that estate 
taxes constitute a lien on the assets of the estate from the date 
of death (Apps.t Brfr p. 20}. 
In Thompson ~·. Thompson (Tex~ Civ. App.) 230 S.W. 
2d 3 76, ( 19 50) (modified on other grounds at 149 Tex. 632~ 
236 S.\X'. 2d 779), the court held that federal estate taxes and 
.state taxes on transfer of the testator's estate were ndebtsu 
within the provision in the 'vill directing that the testator's 
just debts be paid. In Penn's Executor v. Penn's Executor~ 120 
Ky~ 557~ 87 S.W~ 306 ( 1905), the court held that .. White 
taxes are not~ strictly speaking, debts, yet they are obligations 
or liabilities~'· and where a testator by Vi-Till di retted payment 
of all funeral expenses and ~tdebts'~ out of his personal estate 
as soon as practicable and gave the balance of the personal 
es ~ J. t e to his wife~ the intention was to include all obligations 
and liabilities against the estate of every character, including 
taxes. In W acbovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Greenj 236 N+C. 
654~ 73 S.f.. 2d 879~ ( 1953) ~ the court held that the v..rord 
'~debts~' included federal estate tax for purposes of a statute 
prescribing the order of payment of decedenf s debts~ In 
Van H on::,er v. Myers~ 98 Okla. 243, 224 Pac. 977 ( 1924), the 
court held that taxes due the United States, state~ county or 
cityJ constituted a ~~debt" against the estate of the decedent 
\\~hich must be paid before it is subject to distribution to his 
heirs or devisees I 
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In addition~ seve ra 1 cour t5 have held that payment of 
legacies is computed from the distr i bu table estate after deduc-
~ion of all chargesT Thus~ in Wells f). A1enn, 158 Fla. 228~ 28 
So. 2d 881 ( 1946), the testatrix bequeathed lO~--o of her estate 
to her step-son and all the rest and residue of every kind to 
her husband. The court he td that the s tep~son V!rras entitled 
to lOf>;· of the net or distributable estate after the payment of 
debts, tax ex .and other ex penscs o £ administration and not 
1 Oo/o of the gross estate. In Die ke} v. Dickey, ( 8 Cir.) 94 
P ed. 2 31 ( 18 99) ~ the testa tor bequeathed $2 0, 000 to his brother, 
but further provided : ~~In case my estate and property at the 
time of my decease does not amount ot more tb an the sum of 
$50,000 at a fair valuation~ then in that event it is my will 
that my said b rather shall receive only the sum of $1 0~ 000 
cash instead of the $2 0)000 hereinbefore mentioned.), The 
court he] d that the testa tor obvious I y intended that the valua-
tion be placed upon the net distributable estate deducting from 
the va Juation the debt then owing and \ .... hich his estate was 
liable to pay. 
1\To r can one tgnore th c use of th c word ·~net~'.. \V hich 
Black~ s Lau: Dictionary defines as He lear of anything extra~ 
neo us; \Vi th all deductions, such as charges~ expenses, discounts, 
commissions, taxes, etc.'~ (3rd Ed., pL 1239). 
It is difficult to follow appellants' argument on rome Df 
the authorities cited. They contend taxes should not be de· 
ducted, yet cite Edu~ards x;. Slocum, 287 Fed~ 651, aff'd. 264 
U.S. 61 ( 1924), which they themselves state mereJy hold~ 
that if federal and state taxes \vere ~"included/' net value of 
the estate could not be computed without use of an algebraic 
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formula (Apps~~ Brf. p. 19). Respondents submit that by 
either conceding or denying this point, the solving of the 
p rob I em be£ ore us is not assisted one whit, a.s taxes were not 
nincluded'' in the instant case. Moreover, decisions dealing 
with tax problems such as Edwards v~ Slocurn 1 supra, are of no 
assistance in the instant case where the court is seeking to 
find the intent of the testator~ and not the extent of certain 
tax structures. 
Nor are the cases cited dealing with the wills in v.l hlch 
the marital deduction is used of any assistance (the Auerbach 
w iJ l was d r a \V n be£ ore the marital deduction \Vas applicable 
as a means of tax reduction) . Thus, In Re Lie befmant s W i! !J 
147 N.Y.S. 2d 815 ( 19'5), cited by appellants, the testator 
was found to have intended to obtain the maximum marital 
deduction allowable and to do that within the context of the 
marital deduction this could only be done by computing net 
estate without deducting estate taxes~ 
It is not clear for what purpose appellants refer to the 
Federal Estate Tax return filed for the estate. AppelJants do 
not <luarrel with the figures. They do not conten·d that assets 
were undervalued. They merely quarrel with the means of 
computation of net value. For this purpose~ tne tax return 
is irrelevant and immated al. Surely decedent did not j ntend 
~·net value of my estate~ both at my death and at the time of 
distribution'·· to mean the taxable net estate as sho\vn on a 
Federal Estate Tax Form. Appellants further believe that 
any reference to the document produced at the executrix .. s 
deposition is improper. Bee au se the document was unsigned 
and merely came from another law firm~s file~ respondents 
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expressly refused to stipulate that it was an acrur ate copy 
of the return actually filed (Dep~ of Fannie F. A. Samuels, 
P- 79-81). It was not introduced ~~subject to verification~· as 
appelJants state (AppsL· Brf. pL 9). 
Respondents vigorously assert that the question of re-
interpretation is not properly before this court, but in any event~ 
in 1 ight of all of the facts, the legacies were proper 1 y con-
strued by the court order of 1940. 
CONCLUSION 
There is no merit in appellants' attack on the decree of 
May 2l, 1940, as the will was properly construed~ Moreover, 
appellants are bar red by the terms of the order of May 21~ 
19 40~ from re-li tiga ting their claim.. The record is complete] y 
devoid of facts to justify a .finding that this prior order wa5 
obtained by extrinsic fraud, and in fact, this was not the case. 
A ppella.n ts are also bar red both by the statute of limitations 
and their I aches. For this reason~ respondents contend that 
appellants' action was properly dismissed. 
Respectful J y submitted, 
A. J. Colton 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
800 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City 1, Utah 
Atlorne}'J for Respondents 
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Dear Jim: 
APPENDIX A 
July 12, 1946 
Re: Estate of Fred erick S. Auerbach 
Receipt is acknowledged of your letter of July 9 ~ 1946 
·with enclosures~ and I will attend tc the rna tter o £ the transfer 
of the certificates in due course. 
There are some other 1 oo se ends that I ran across '\\T h1ch 
ought to be cleared up. 
In the Deseret Co. Mrs_ Fanny Fox Samuels holds Certifi-
cate No. 10 for 500 shares_ There is Certificate No. J 1 for 500 
shares in the name of Frederick S7 Auerbach, but there still 
remains Certificate No. 12 for 2000 shares in the name of 
Fre-derick S. Auerbach. The remaining stock of the company 
is held 3000 shares still in the name of Herbert S. Auerbach 
and 3000 shares in the name of Beatrice Fox Auerbachr This 
company may never amount to anything~ but as the thing 
stands, I think the stockholders ought to be straightened out. 
With regard to Her bertts stock, that \Vas purchased by 
hi~ sisters and can, of course, be transfer red in due course. Mrs. 
Beatrice Auerbach can handle her stock free 1 y of course. But 
your order of distribution of the estate of Frederick Sr Auerbach 
should probably authorize the transfer of the certificate for 
2000 shares abovermentioned to the Trustee. 
Mr. Clark has the minute book and the stock share books. 
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By the v..Tay] in clause Second of Frederick S. Auerbach's 
will is a provision that out of the surplus of the net estate of 
$3 50 ~000 bequests of $10,000 were payable to his sisters. Now 
that the est a. te is com p tetely administered~ I would appreciate 
it if you could let us have a summary statement of what it 
amounted to~ if it is not too m uc::h trouble. 
With kindest regards, 
Sincere! y yours, 
Edwin M. Otterbourg 
To: James Ingebretsen, Esqr 
Ingeb retsen, Ray, Rawlins & 
Christensen 
I 0 11 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City 1, Utah 
AIR MAlL 
cc: Mrs. Werner 
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APPENDIX B 
lNGEBRETSEN, RAY1 RAWLINS & CHRISTENSEN 
Attorneys and Counselors 
Suite 1011-17 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City 1 
July 18, 1946 
Mr~ Edwin M. Otterbourg 
Otterbourg~ Steindler & Houston 
200 Fifth Avenue 
New York City, New York 
Dear Ed: 
RECEIVED 
JULY 22, 1946 
I acknowledge your kind favor of July 12th. I am begin-
ning \v hat I hope will prove a 'Vacation. I am spending a few 
days at home in pre lim.lnary prepa rtion s for a trip to visit my 
son in los Angeles. During the few days required for that 
purpose I will be available through my secretary+ She will also 
know my address in Los Angeles when I reach that city. I men-
tion this in case something urgent should arise during my 
absence. 
I w i 11 now attempt to answer tb e two q ucstions which you 
submitted. 
First: Deseret Development Company~ George~ Fred and 
Herbert initiated this en te rp rise a bon t the time ( 1 916) v,r hen 
the T i ntic Standard Mining Company began profitable opera-
tions in the sv..·ale near the plains of Juab County. I believe the 
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boys had an idea that the ore business found in Tintic Standard 
might extend under the pta in. At any rate~ they picked up con-
siderable grazing ground extending east and north of the mine. 
Some of the ground 'vas purchased prior to the death of George 
and more prior to the death of Fred. Herbert bought still more 
for several years but seemed to abandon alJ interest quite a 
f e\\.. years ago. A l itt 1 e rent has been derived from grazers but 
hardly enough to pay taxes~ Clark has received tbe rent, paid 
the taxes and other expenses and then assessed the ov.•ners 
for the deficit. Fred donated a few shares to his wife and a 
1 esser a mount to his son. However, the ownership was con-
fined to the three brothers on the basis of about one-third each. 
The project was finally in corpora ted under the name of Deseret 
Development Company and stock was issued in proportion to 
tl1 e amounts coot r ibuted by the three brothers. I be I i eve you 
finally J ocated the books r o Mr. Clark's hands~ It .seems to me 
your eli en ts ~ to get her with Fannie and Be a~ or her daughters, 
as the present stockholders, should agree upon a new board 
of directors and officers~ whereupon it might be advisabJ e to 
leave this enterprise, together with any bookkeeping and tax 
returns incident thereto, in the hands of either Mr. Kelley 
of l\.1 r. Co 11 ins. I agree "vi th your s u ggestlon that if and when 
the company is reorganized you should delegate some one to 
examine and appraise the property with the view to obtaining 
recommendations or a decision on whether to put it to some 
profitable use or dis pose of it or perhaps hold it indefinitely, 
as the boys have done. 
Second: Fred's legacy to his sisters. At an early date in 
the administration of Fred~ s estate reports were submitted to 
the court 'vith respect to the closing value and also the final 
net value of h i.s estate. This value proved to be under S 3 50,000. 
There is on file in the Cler kt s off ice in this proceeding a report 
covering this entire matter~ together with an order of the 
court under which it proved impossible to make any paymeot 
to Fred t s sisters. I can secure for you certified copies of thes-e 
p.a pers if you desire. 0 n the other hand~ on your next visit I 
can let you have copies in my file of all papers with the libenj' 
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to make such excerpts therefrom as you desire+ This matter 
was all handled under the very c 1ose supervision of Mr. Her-
brrt. He and I were obliged both before and after this deter· 
m •nation to vis it New York, and he alone on one or rnro 
occasions~ and both of us on one occasion, pres en ted the en tire 
matter to the girls and left with them copies of ail pertinent 
r ~t pers. I would be pleased to go over this in greater detail 
\vhen we next meet. 
I£ and Vt~" hen you decide on a.n y course of a(tion with respect 
to Deseret Develo pm en t Company l unless that can a wait your 
next vis it, I will be glad to do anything within my power J 
provided you "VIt1 ill have the minute book .and stock book sent 
to my office~ 
With very kindest regards and best wishes~ I am 
JI:RK 
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Sincerely, 
Is/ James Ingebretsen (rk) 
JAMES INGEBRETSEN 
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